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Abstract
This is an inquiry into the economic psychology of trust: that is, what model of the political
economy of complex liberal democracies is conducive to attitudes that allow difference to be
perceived in the terms of ‘significant other’, rather than as a menacing or an irrelevant stranger.
As a test case of prevailing perceptions of otherness in European societies, I examine attitudes
towards Turkey’s accession to the European Union.
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Introduction: strangers and significant others
A diverse society offers three options for the status of otherness: the ‘others’ could
just be strangers, irrelevant to us; they could be a menace, a threatening otherness;
or they could be ‘significant’ others – quite like the term we use when we describe
our life partner as the other who complements and completes us. Rather than dis-
cussing the cultural parameters of a diverse and inclusive society, I prefer here to
focus my inquiry on the socio-economic conditions facilitating attitudes of trust and
acceptance of difference. In other words, we might ask: What is the political econ-
omy (that is, the pattern of relations between public authority and market forces)
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enabling psychological attitudes within which otherness is perceived positively, in
the terms of ‘significant other’? Why would we want to bring political economy into
the discussion of diversity? Because a facile multiculturalism that ignores the socio-
economic dynamics that generates a collective psychology of openness and inclusion
is bound to fail in its ambition: cosmopolitanism is untenable without a political
economy of trust.
To advance this argument, I will examine recent attitudes among European Union
citizens towards Turkey’s accession to the EU. Attitudes to Turkey’s prospective EU
membership supply relevant evidence for analyzing the conditions of effective
diversity for two reasons. First, attitudes to EU enlargement are a good proxy for
attitudes to otherness because acceptance of a new member-state necessitates not
merely a neutral attitude towards the other (the new member) but an unambiguously
positive one: the other should be seen as a ‘significant’ other. Accession of a new
country to the EU is quite like a marriage: after a period of courtship (i.e. the appli-
cation for EU membership and subsequent negotiations), the two sets of countries
(old and new members) begin building a common life. From this angle, the under-
lying question is: What do the registered public attitudes toward Turkey’s accession
to the EU tell us about the terms in which otherness is currently perceived in
Europe?
Second, the process of EU enlargement over the past decade has brought to light
the relations among political, cultural and socio-economic dimensions of building a
cosmopolitan, diverse community. The most recent round of EU enlargement (the
accession of the former communist countries of eastern and central Europe) proved
that empathy and good intentions for inclusion are insufficient drivers of effective
diversity. The infatuation with the possibility to stabilize democratic reforms after the
fall of communism by including the new democracies in the EU had masked the fact
that these countries were mere strangers, and not significant others, to the old EU
member-states. The difficulties that ensued – rising corruption in some of the new
member-states, the abuse of EU funds, or the deterioration of labor-market standards
in the old member-states due to competition from eastern Europe – have now shed
light on socio-economic dimensions of political belonging that had been overlooked.
To take up the marriage metaphor, the post-enlargement troubles were a lamentable
confirmation of Oscar Wilde’s dictum that in courtship people lose their heads, in
marriage they discover the loss. My point is that the sensitivity towards non-
cultural and non-institutional parameters of inclusive diversity that the latest experi-
ence with EU enlargement has freshly brought about prompts a rethinking of the con-
ditions for a cosmopolitan society, of which the EU is often seen as a blueprint. From
this perspective, the leading question in examining Turkey’s accession to the EU is:
What are the conditions under which Turkey could be embraced by EU citizens in the
terms of a significant other – a life partner?
I will proceed as follows. First, after outlining a framework of analysis, I will articulate
the parameters within which otherness tends to be perceived currently in Europe, drawing
on evidence from the first EU-wide deliberative polls held in 2007. In the second part
of the article, I will address the socio-political dynamics that underpin current changes
in attitudes to diversity and difference.
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1 The EU deliberative poll: a microcosm of the EU’s public
sphere
In order to capture the current socio-cultural climate in Europe I now turn to
the deliberative polls that were held at the European Parliament in October 2007.
At that time, a random sample of 362 citizens from all 27 EU member-states spent a
weekend at the European Parliament building in Brussels.1 Giving us a glimpse of the
deliberative polls at work, the media at that time presented them as a process of ‘getting
the London cab driver to talk to the Marseilles dockworker’2 on two sets of issues: (1)
social and economic policy in the EU; (2) EU external relations, including EU enlarge-
ment. In my analysis here I will focus on attitudes towards enlargement, especially con-
cerning Turkey’s accession to the EU.
Before I proceed with the analysis, let me validate my choice of empirical evidence.
Why do I prefer to look at these deliberative polls, rather than at standard public opinion
surveys (for instance, Eurobarometer polls)? On the one hand, standard public opinion
surveys are only snapshots of opinions, which are likely to reflect a temporary mood
linked to parochial concerns; thus they are unsuitable to the particular goals of concep-
tualizing and analyzing more general societal attitudes to otherness. On the other hand,
due to its particular design, deliberative polling avoids some of the typical shortfalls of
sterile laboratory experiments in deliberative democracy.3 This is mostly due to the fact
that, as participants are selected by random sampling, and the selected cohort is suffi-
ciently large, the group is representative of the larger community, thus avoiding what
Cass Sunstein has criticized as ‘group polarization’ (the deepened radicalization of opi-
nions participants already hold).4 This supplies two reasons for relying on deliberative
polling. First, due to measures facilitating the formation of informed opinion, such as
provision of balanced information to participants, and the possibility they are given for
consulting with experts holding different positions, we may take the deliberative polls to
be representative of the European public sphere at its best (that is, a public sphere in
which issues of governance are discussed on the basis of arguments informed by a wide
range of evidence). Second, the changes of opinion registered at these polls can be
taken to represent tendencies now at work in European societies, as public deliberations,
especially when conducted according to the deliberative polls technology, give a
communicative expression of existing social conflicts, thereby bringing to the fore latent
tendencies that cannot be captured in standard opinion polls.5 In this way, the process of
deliberative polling captures wider societal dynamics of opinion-formation than what is
achieved by taking the temperature of a public’s mood as both standard opinion surveys
and the typical experiments in deliberative policy-making tend to do.
Let me clarify this last point in order to shed light on the status I attribute to public
deliberations in socio-political analysis more generally. Considered as a social practice
(rather than as ideal conditions for testing the legitimacy of claims in a counterfactual
manner), deliberations are not isolated from the rest of the social practices through which
individuals interact, and in which they are socialized within specific contexts. What
deliberations initially do is to enable participants to bring in a variety of reference points
they have acquired in their personal contexts of socialization. In the course of mutual
argumentation, the diversity of reference points that individual participants introduce
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comes to form a structured field of references (a structured public reason) in the follow-
ing way. In the process of discussions, reference points start to relate among themselves
through connections that give them particular signification. For instance, the European
Union, as a reference point, might be articulated in relation to national sovereignty, to
European states, to the United States, to religion (the issue of Christian spiritual outlook),
to economic affluence, to the ‘European social model’, etc. All these are available
references, but they are not equally relevant to the debate on enlargement, as we shall see.
Shared perceptions are thus formed concerning which issues are salient ones. In other
words, the formulation of conflicting positions (e.g. ‘enlargement is beneficial/detrimen-
tal to multiculturalism’) is both constrained and enabled by basic overlapping agreement
on what issues count (are visible) as politically significant ones – salient issues of
governance around which normative debate and political contestation take place.6
These first articulations of visibility are not a matter of factual knowledge (e.g. the EU
is in Europe), nor do they have an evaluative function (e.g. implying that Christianity is
superior to Islam); they simply orient judgment by way of drawing distinctions, by dis-
cernment of what, among the vast sea of knowledge participants together possess, stands
out to claim attention. This process of drawing distinctions and establishing linkages
among reference points consequently leads to the formation of what I have described
as a framework of articulation and signification shared by participants irrespectively
of any moral disagreement they might have; it even enables the communicative
expression of that disagreement.7 While a quantitative analysis of opinion polls indicates
what normative positions people hold (e.g. for or against enlargement), only a qualitative
analysis of deliberations can indicate how opinion is structured: what the issues in relation
to which a normative disagreement acquires meaning are, what cognitive connections are
drawn (e.g. whether enlargement is perceived in relation to cultural diversity or in relation
to economic insecurity) in the formation of opinion. In this way, public deliberations may
alter the parameters of the debate on governance (concerning both the justice and the expe-
diency of particular policy) by way of giving political relevance to previously unques-
tioned social practices. For instance, they might establish a link between immigration
and job insecurity (as we see now often in political discourse), a link that had not been
present earlier. Demands for job security would then entail demands for closed borders.
2 Europe’s new discursive landscape
Let us now examine, within the framework of analysis outlined above, the public
deliberations as they took place at the European Parliament building during that October
weekend in 2007. A quantitative analysis of the data shows that, after deliberations,
participants decreased their support for enlargement,8 while they increased their support
for neo-liberal economic reforms9 and increased their self-identification as Europeans
(see Table 1). These shifts were accompanied by substantial knowledge gains
(20%–22%), indicating that participants formed considered opinions on the issues under
discussion. What is puzzling in these outcomes is the combination of liberal attitudes on
economic policy and anti-liberal attitudes on the EU’s relations with the outside world
(attitudes towards otherness). Within the standard ideological geography of Europe, this
is an unusual combination. The two main political families in postwar Europe have been
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socialism and conservatism. The former has traditionally combined support for regulated
markets with cultural pluralism and cosmopolitanism; the latter has combined moderate
support for unregulated and open markets with a stronger emphasis on national sover-
eignty. The combination, registered by these polls, between (1) growing supra-national
European identity, (2) hostility to outsiders (as registered in the decreased support for
enlargement), and (3) economic liberalism, is a new one on the European ideological
landscape. How could we interpret this development and what are its implications for
socio-cultural pluralism?
The evidence from the deliberative polls displays that, although cultural and religious
differences were perceived to be relevant to enlargement (for instance, such a connection
ismade inmany participants’ statements – see Table 2), decreasing support for enlargement
was not co-related to aversion to cultural and religious difference. Thus, agreement with the







1. Adding a Muslim country to the EU would make the EU
too diverse.
43 41






3. Adding more countries to the EU would make it more
difficult for the EU to make decisions.
52 62
Economic policy
4. People and companies should be free to compete
economically.
65 75
5. Increasing job security allows workers to become more
skilled.
76 68
6. Keeping the retirement rules the way they are will
bankrupt the retirement system.
Yes: 48 Yes: 62
7. Raising the retirement age (support the idea) Yes: 13 Yes: 20
8. Lowering barriers to international trade (support the idea) 27 30




10. Freer trade makes all the countries involved more
prosperous.
Yes: 27 Yes: 29
11. Making our economy competitive in the global arena is
important to me.
85 89
12. Earning as much money as possible is important to me. 56 58
Political identity (national vs EU)
13. Decision-making in pensions should be made by the
individual member-states versus the EU.
54 47
14. Unanimity (national veto) on issues of social policy at the
European Council (support the idea).
47 44
15. Do you think of yourself as being European? Yes: 77 Yes: 85
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statement ‘Adding a Muslim country to the EU would make the EU too diverse’ decreased
slightly (from 42.7% to 41.3%), and the statement ‘The admittance of a Muslim country
would be a problem’ was mentioned 16 times while the statement ‘The admittance of a
Muslim country would not be a problem’ was mentioned 21 times (see Table 2).
While support for enlargement, as a proxy for attitudes towards otherness, did not
acquire signification via a connection to concerns for cultural and religious pluralism,
it attained connotation via a connection to socio-economic concerns related to globaliza-
tion. The sequencing of the discussion of enlargement to follow the debates on
socio-economic issues brought the latter into the framework of relevance within which
enlargement was interpreted. As I have noted, the analysis of the data indicates a
correlation between aversion to enlargement and support for globalization and neo-
liberal economic reforms. This shift in favor of neo-liberal economic policy is reflected
in the questions in the second section of Table 1: from those concerning job security and
pensions, to free trade and economic competitiveness.
Table 2. European poll/qualitative analysis of discussion on enlargement
Topic Positions and number of statements
Culture
1. The admittance of a Muslim country
would . . .
be a problem: 16 not be a problem: 21
Geopolitics
2. Influence of EU in the world would . . . increase: 6 decrease: 1
3. Relations with the Muslim world would
. . .
improve: 7 worsen: 0
4. Enlargement would help/hurt EU’s
military/security . . .
help: 9 hurt: 1
Economics
5. EU aid to EU’s current countries would
. . .
increase: 0 decrease: 3




7. EU’s financial impact of enlargement
would be . . .
good: 6 bad: 7
8. Own country’s financial impact of
enlargement would be . . .
good: 0 bad: 2
9. Personal financial impact of
enlargement would be . . .
good: 1 bad: 1
Governance
10. Enlargement would make EU’s
decision-making capacity . . .
easier 5 harder 9
11. EU is adding countries . . . too fast 19 not fast enough 0
The charts shown in tables 1 and 2 are adapted from the documentation on the EU-wide deliberative
polls, publicly available at the website of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, Stanford University: http://cdd.
stanford.edu/polls/eu/
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In what sense could positive attitudes to economic openness be compatible with, or
even entail, aversion to political openness? The element translating support for neo-
liberal economic policy into political support for ‘closed border’ policies is the economic
psychology of fear that has recently started to dominate the public agenda in Europe.
3 Social hazards and the politics of fear
With the diminished redistributive functions of the state in recent years, access to the
labor market has become a powerful factor for stratification. In a context of economic
growth without job creation, as well as in the current context of jobless recovery from
the recent global financial meltdown, employment is no longer an element of economic
policy. It is, rather, a rare good to be distributed – a parameter of social justice. Conse-
quently, the distribution of access to the labor market has become the major arena of
social conflict. As a result, a new public agenda has appeared in recent years in response
to sharpened sensitivity to economic and political risk itself linked to fears from the
anticipated social impact of globalization – mainly insecurity in the maintenance of a
standard of living, as well as physical unsafety. What we could refer to as the new
order-and-safety agenda has four constitutive elements: physical security; political
order; cultural estrangement; and income insecurity.10 Let us note that while in the old
public agenda (of the postwar welfare state) employment had been approached in terms
of overall growth and efficiency, the new agenda refers to unemployment in terms of
fear, loss and marginalization.
The order-and-safety agenda has fostered the spread of politics of fear of the other.
We have all observed the rise of xenophobia, but also of other illiberal practices in
Europe (a general call for law, safety and order), at least since the mid-1990s when
electoral support for populist parties started to rise sharply. Actions such as calls to limit
immigration, to ban the building of minarets, or even to increase safety measures in
public spaces at the expense of privacy, all signal the emergence of a socio-cultural
climate hostile to diversity, openness and experimentation, a context in which otherness
is perceived negatively and is thus unwelcome.
At the root of the large range of illiberal practiceswe havewitnessed recently is a change
of the ideological landscape since the turn of the century, in other words, a change of the
main lines of ideological identification and confrontation. There are two elements within
this new ideological landscape11 that are particularly relevant to our concerns today:
(1) the mainstreaming of xenophobia. Hostility to difference is no longer the exclusive
domain of the extreme right; it has entered the political mainstream. Illustrations of
this mainstreaming are slogans raised by parties of the center-left and the center-
right, such as ‘British jobs for British workers’, or the drop in support for Turkey’s
accession to the European Union among the political leadership and the electoral
constituencies of center-right parties (i.e. in Germany and France) that had initially
supported it.
(2) the new, economic nature of xenophobia. In contrast to the old version in which
hostility to foreigners was cast in the terms of protection of cultural and political
sovereignty, the foundation of xenophobia is now economic. It is related to
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perceived threats to socio-economic well-being (especially job loss) brought about
by the open border policies of globalization. In a word, this is not a cultural, but an
economic, xenophobia. Note, for instance, that ‘classical’ parties of the far right,
such as the Front National party in France, have been adopting since the 1990s
a new, hostile stance to free and open markets.
This new type of xenophobia is ushering in a novel political era in European politics,
marked by a strong aversion to socio-cultural diversity in which ‘other cultures’ become
easy targets of social anxiety. This hostility to otherness has started to permeate the ideo-
logical family of the left as much as that of the right. As fear of job outsourcing in the
context of globalization is becoming shared across the working and the middle classes,
economic xenophobia has come to taint the discourse of the center-left and the center-
right.12
Most importantly, this new ‘order-and-safety’ agenda is eclipsing and undermining
two public agendas that had been mutually empowering in the past: that of social soli-
darity (enabled by the redistributive functions of the state), and that of inclusive cultural
diversity. Let me set out the way these two agendas had been connected in the past in
order to clarify the contours of what I call ‘the political economy of trust’ that is quickly
eroding.
4 The political economy of trust
A broad societal agreement on social rights had made possible the reconciliation
between capitalism and democracy after the Second World War. Let us not forget that
the postwar welfare state consensus on curbing economic liberalism with state-
managed redistributive policies was supported by conservative and by socialist parties.
In other words, only a broad consensus between the center-left and the center-right on the
value of social solidarity, as well as on the responsibility of public authority to ensure it,
made possible the political economy of growth and redistribution that had been charac-
teristic of the welfare state in Europe.
Added to this broad consensus on social solidarity was another consensus: the rise of
the post-material agenda within which cultural diversity came to be celebrated in the
1970s, which was itself enabled by the political economy of the welfare state. According
to Ronald Inglehart’s well-known analysis, based on the World Values Survey, sociali-
zation in the context of economic affluence and security generated by the postwar
welfare state led to the rise of post-material values linked to self-expression, freedom and
quality of life. This resulted in the shift, since the 1970s, from the ‘old politics’ of
bread-and-butter concerns (such as income and housing) to ‘new politics’ centered on
lifestyle, citizen democracy, identity rights and concerns with the environment.13 It was
the success of the politics of social solidarity, and the shift it brought about from issues of
material prosperity and equality to those of identity and lifestyle, that opened the
cognitive space for the agenda of diversity and multiculturalism in advanced industrial
democracies. This combination of public attitudes and policies (a synergy between social
solidarity and multiculturalism) had been characteristic of the European welfare state as
it developed in the four postwar decades. The current erosion of the social justice agenda
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under pressures for neo-liberal reforms might thus be said to be having an adverse effect
on the multiculturalism agenda.
The described change has three key parameters. First, globalization has increased the
range of economic opportunity (i.e. by way of greater diversity of forms of ownership
and job tenure), but at the cost of increased insecurity (e.g. for investment and job loss).
Second, increased belief in the inevitable nature of (globalization-induced) economic
volatility has increased concerns with governance. This correlation between unquestioning
acceptance of globalization and growing concerns with governance is well captured in the
EU polls data: as support for globalization, as well as allegiance to the EU have increased
(see questions 4–15 in Table 1), concerns for governance have also risen (see question
3 in Table 1 and question 10 in Table 2). It is this acceptance of neo-liberal economic
reforms as being without alternative, combined with apprehension about the nebulous
risks that such reforms are bound to incur, that have generated the politics of fear now
haunting Europe. We are confronted with the ominous novelty of anti-immigrant
sentiment among the working classes, based on fear of job loss and subsequent social
fallout.14 Consequently, the typical constituency of left parties (wage-labor) has begun
lending its support to extreme right parties. Under such pressures left parties have thus
begun engaging in economic xenophobia, as much as extreme-right parties do.
I will describe the third parameter of the change as ‘individual responsibilization’.
Regulatory policy in the late 20th century has enforced individual self-reliance, as the
state began using its legal authority to shift responsibility to citizens – on issues ranging
from maintaining a healthy lifestyle, to protection of the environment, remaining
employable, finding jobs and securing pensions. This new citizen responsibilization is
captured by the EU polls, for instance, in the registered increase in declared personal
responsibility for fighting climate change (driving a smaller car, paying higher prices for
electricity, taking trains) to working longer. While Ulrich Beck sees such a shift in atti-
tudes in a positive light, as a move of ‘turning collective requirements into individual
opportunities for choice’,15 it seems to me that individual responsibilization in the
context of the economic uncertainty typical of globalization is in fact a negative devel-
opment insofar as it is conducive to political and cultural conservatism, to attitudes
opposed to cosmopolitanism. Autonomy that imposes an overwhelming burden of
responsibility on individuals for their well-being quickly decays into what Erich Fromm
called ‘fear of freedom’.
In relation to this, a new alliance of social forces is being formed around a ‘risk’ pole
of political mobilization, which rallies behind policies of economic patriotism –
a combination of domestic market liberalization and a closed (protected) economy, as
well as cultural sovereigntism (anti-immigrant sentiment). It is the emergence of this
alliance of social forces that the EU-wide deliberative polls in 2007 registered.16
5 Political responsibility and neo-liberal hegemony
Changes in economic policy that underlie the developments I have described above are
commonly deemed to be caused by the inevitable impact of globalization, which
increases competitive pressures on national economies. Thus, these policies have been
dressed in a hegemonic discourse presenting the need to compete in the global economy,
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to accept cuts in social security and to face employment insecurity, as being without
alternative. This naturalization of globalization (its acceptance as a natural, rather than
a socially engineered, phenomenon) is well reflected by the EU polls. Note, for instance,
that support for the statement ‘Keeping the retirement rules the way they are will bank-
rupt the retirement system’ rose from 48% to 62%, as agreement with the statement
‘Increasing job security allows workers to become more skilled’ decreased from 76%
to 68%. However, behind the alleged objective inevitability of labor-market liberalization
stand specific policies of the European Union, agreed upon bymember-state governments
– economic policy imposing a formula of productivity-focused jobless growth. This eco-
nomic policy formula generates insecurity even as it effectively generates growth.
If there were ever doubts about the ‘objective’ necessity for labor-market liberaliza-
tion and deregulation, commonly justified with the impending bankruptcy of public
finances, these doubts were dispelled when states poured billions of public funds into the
banking system during the 2008–9 global financial crises coming to the rescue of finan-
cial capital. A state intervention on such a large scale and so systemic in its nature
brought to light the hegemonic nature of the discourse on the alleged incapacity of the
state to finance generous social insurance and job-creation policy. It is the forced
retrenchment of the welfare state, under the hegemonic discourse about the necessity for
neo-liberal reforms and individual responsibilization of citizens, that has triggered
the politics of fear that is tearing apart European societies. Neither national governments
nor EU institutions are free of that guilt.
Conclusion
A quantitative reading of the EU deliberative polls of 2007 conveys that increased
opposition to Turkey’s accession to the EU is based neither on cultural nor on religious
sentiment. A qualitative reading, and the analysis I have offered here, reveal that it is,
instead, related to concerns with economic survival in the uncertain context of globali-
zation. ‘Closed-border’ attitudes are grounded on the emerging culture of individual
responsibility for economic survival which has redefined the legitimacy relationship
between public authority and citizens in recent years. The more individuals have to
accept responsibility for their own economic well-being within a context of economic
uncertainty, the more they are averse to otherness – as they see the other as a hostile
competitor, rather than as a ‘significant’ other.
I have argued that globalization has disabled some of the key causal mechanisms that
had fostered the rise of the post-material ‘new politics’ of diversity, recognition and
inclusion. It has eroded the politics of economic security (and not simply affluence) that
had enabled positive attitudes to cultural and religious difference to emerge and conso-
lidate in the 1960–80s. This era is now being gradually eclipsed by the return of a public
agenda centered on material (economic and political) risk linked to insecurity of income
and physical unsafety.
While the social question returns in the 21st century with the threat of a rapid impov-
erishment of the middle classes, it is for the first time that national social justice agendas
are so sharply opposed to transnational and transcultural solidarity: globalization has
placed the two in a zero-sum game. The cosmopolitan concerns, typical of the new left,
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are now clashing with the social justice agenda of the old left (an agenda based on growth
and redistribution). What is now urgently needed are new societal alliances demanding
the economic responsibilization of public authority vis-a`-vis citizens. Only then can the
post-material agenda of recognition, inclusion and genuine concern for the other that
briefly flourished in the late 20th century, be revived to counter the politics of fear now
raging in Europe.
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